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It has been widely accepted that constraints on the wholesale funding of bank 
balance sheets amplify the transmission of monetary policy through what is called 
the ‘bank lending channel’. We show that the effect of such bank balance sheet 
constraints on monetary transmission is in fact theoretically ambiguous, with the 
prior expectation, based on standard theoretical models of household and 
corporate portfolios, that the bank lending channel attenuates monetary policy 
transmission. 
  We examine macroeconomic data for the G8 countries and find no evidence 
that banking sector deposits respond negatively and more than lending to 
tightening of monetary policy, as the accepted view of the bank lending channel 
requires. The overall picture is mixed, but these data generally suggest that 
deposits fluctuate procyclically and somewhat less over the business cycle than 
bank lending, and that total bank deposits, unlike bank lending, show little direct 
response to changes in interest rates. This suggests it is very unlikely that the bank 
lending channel amplifies monetary policy. Our paper has thus corrected a 
misunderstanding about the role of banks in monetary policy transmission that has 
persisted in the literature for some two decades. 
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Uudelleenarviointi: pankkien merkitys rahapolitiikan 
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Alistair Milne – Geoffrey Wood 




Suhteellisen yleisen käsityksen mukaan pankkeihin kohdistuvat tukkumarkkinoi-
den rajoitteet niiden rahoittaessa taseitaan voimistavat rahapolitiikan vaikutuksia 
taloudessa. Tässä yhteydessä puhutaan tavanomaisesti rahapolitiikan vaikutusten 
pankkikanavasta osana rahapolitiikan yleistä välittymismekanismia. Tässä työssä 
osoitetaan, että näiden rahoitusrajoitteiden vaikutukset rahapolitiikan välittymi-
seen ovat itse asiassa teoreettisesti epäselviä, vaikka tavanomaiset kotitalouksien 
ja yritysten varallisuuden määräytymistä selittävät teoreettiset mallit puoltavatkin 
ennakkokäsitystä pankkikanavasta rahapolitiikan vaikutuksia voimistavana tekijä-
nä. Työn empiirisessä osassa tutkitaan G8-maiden tilastohavaintoja, joiden ei 
katsota tukevan oletusta, että pankkisektorin talletukset reagoisivat rahapolitiikan 
kiristämiseen negatiivisesti ja voimakkaammin kuin lainananto. Tämä oletus on 
sen käsityksen mukainen, että pankkikanava voimistaa rahapolitiikan vaikutuksia. 
Empiirinen näyttö ei kaiken kaikkiaan ole yksiselitteistä, mutta viittaa siihen, että 
talletukset vaihtelevat myötäsyklisesti ja jonkin verran lainanantoa vaimeammin. 
Toisin kuin pankkien lainananto, pankkitalletusten kokonaismäärä ei myöskään 
näytä merkittävästi reagoivan koron muutoksiin. Näiden tulosten perusteella ei ole 
ilmeistä, että pankkikanava voimistaa rahapolitiikan vaikutuksia. Tämä tutkimus 
siis osaltaan korjaa alan kirjallisuudessa jo muutaman vuosikymmenen vallinnutta 
väärinkäsitystä pankkien merkityksestä rahapolitiikan välittymisessä. 
 
Avainsanat: luottokanava, rahapolitiikan välittyminen, pankkien rahoitusrajoitteet 
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In any developed modern economy, bank balance sheets comprise a major part of 
the money stock. For example, at the end of 2006 bank deposits amounted to 
83.8% of broad money (M3) in the United States, 101.3% of broad money (M3) 
in the Euro Area, and 121.6% of broad money (M4) in the United Kingdom.
1 
Bank lending to the private sector constituted 70.6% of US broad money, 136.4% 
of Euro area broad money and 150.7% of UK broad money.
2 The behaviour of 
bank lending and bank deposits is therefore clearly important to policy makers. 
Nevertheless, despite a large volume of research, there is still no clearly 
established consensus about the response of banks to changes in monetary policy. 
  Much of the literature adopts the following perspective. The monetary 
authorities tighten monetary policy by reducing available reserves at the central 
bank. This in turn induces a contraction in broader measures of money by 
reducing ‘reservable’ deposits ie those deposits against which reserve 
requirements are calculated. This monetary contraction then operates through two 
different channels. 
  The first is the standard interest rate channel of monetary policy. Banks are 
prepared to pay more for overnight borrowing of reserves. Rates of return on non-
bank assets must also rise, in order to persuade non-banks to hold less wealth in 
the form of reservable deposits. Over time these higher interest rates lower the 
demand for bank loans and also reduce the cash flows of firms and companies 
borrowing at short term rates of interest. As a result the rate of growth of 
aggregate demand and output and the rate of inflation decline. 
  Many argue that a second channel, the ‘bank lending’ channel, operates when 
at least some banks are liquidity constrained. Following a reduction in reserves 
and bank deposits, constrained banks are unable to substitute wholesale market 
funding for lost reservable deposits and so must reduce their lending by more than 
unconstrained banks. If some of their borrowers are also bank dependent, ie 
cannot themselves substitute other non-bank sources of finance for bank loans, 
then the consequence of this reduced loan supply is a larger decline in bank 
lending than would result from the interest rate channel alone. 
  This argument for an additional role for a ‘bank lending’ channel of monetary 
policy was originally developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), amending the 
standard ISLM model to incorporate an additional balance sheet induced 
contraction of the supply of credit, and by Stein (1998), who develops the model 
in a more rigorous fashion incorporating an adverse selection problem in the bank 
                                                 
1 All data in this paragraph are computed from International Financial Statistics, October 2007. 
2 The bank lending figures for the UK and Euro area substantially exceed the bank deposit base. 
The US is not so much different once allowance is made for loans repackaged into asset backed 
securities.  
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funding market. Investigations of the bank lending channel are reported by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (1995), Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) and several other researchers. Kashyap and Stein (2000) conclude, from 
their examination of a large panel of US bank accounting data, that amongst the 
smaller banks in their sample those that have lower liquidity ratios and therefore 
more likely to be constrained in their access to wholesale funding, do indeed 
respond more to changes in monetary policy than banks with higher liquidity 
ratios. However the results of several other empirical studies (for example 
Ehrmann et al, 2003) provide only mixed support for the prediction that 
constrained banks respond more to monetary policy than unconstrained banks. 
  Our paper reconsiders this bank lending mechanism. We show – in the 
analysis developed in Section 4 and Appendix 2 below – that this standard 
exposition of the bank lending channel is flawed, assuming as it does that 
monetary tightening results in an net increase in the demand of banks for 
wholesale funding. The correct logic, allowing for the possibility that bank 
demand for wholesale funding may either rise or fall following an increase of 
interest rate, is as follows: 
 
(i)  If higher interest rates reduce the supply of bank deposits more than the 
demand for bank lending then constrained banks become more financially 
constrained, their effective marginal cost of funding rises, and their loan rates 
and volume of lending both decline by more than those of unconstrained 
banks. The bank lending channel then amplifies the interest rate impact of 
monetary policy. 
(ii) If higher interest rates reduce the demand for bank lending more than they 
reduce the supply of deposits then the opposite outcome emerges: constrained 
banks become less financially constrained, their effective marginal cost of 
funding falls, and their loan rates and volume of lending decline by less than 
those of unconstrained banks. The bank lending channel then attenuates the 
interest rate impact of monetary policy. 
 
We will further argue that this correction to the understanding of the bank lending 
channel can have significant policy implications in situations, such as the present 
time, when bank funding is under strain. 
  We develop this argument as follows. The two sections following this 
introduction provide some supporting preliminary discussion. Section 2 reviews 
the principal contributions to the existing literature on the bank lending channel 
(Appendix 1 provides a fuller review of the large empirical literature). We argue 
in this section that the empirical results of Kashyap and Stein (2000) can be 
interpreted as reflecting either an amplifying or attenuating impact of the bank 
lending channel. Their work, while using a rich microeconomic data set, does not 
resolve the ambiguity of the sign of the bank lending channel.  
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  Section 3 discusses a departure that we make from previous theoretical 
models of the bank lending channel. This is our assumption that the monetary 
policy instrument is the short term interest rate, not the stock of reserves with the 
central bank. We note that while reserves with the central bank (whether 
mandatory or not) play an essential role in the implementation of monetary policy, 
it is usually more convenient, as well as more in line with actual central bank 
practice, to treat reserves as we do as passively responding to the stock of 
reservable deposits. 
  Following these preliminaries Section 4 then discusses the extension of 
standard models of banking sector equilibrium to incorporate the impact of the 
level of market interest rates on bank funding, ie on the flows of bank lending, 
deposits, and wholesale borrowing, and hence on the margins between market and 
bank interest rates. We show that the margins between bank lending rates and 
market rates vary with the level of market rates when banks are ‘financially 
constrained’ ie when banks cannot freely access markets for wholesale borrowing; 
but that the impact of market interest rates on these margins is ambiguous, 
depending upon whether an increase of market interest rate produces a net 
increase or decrease in bank reliance on wholesale funding. Appendix 2 provides 
a full statement of our model and an extension to the case of imperfect 
substitution between loan and deposits and financial constraints that affect some 
banks but not others. 
  Sections 5 attempts to resolve the ambiguity in the sign of the bank lending 
channel through an empirical examination of aggregate quarterly data for the G8 
OECD economies from 1970Q1 onwards (the sources of these data are described 
in Appendix 3). We first report the time series behaviour of bank deposits and 
loans, showing that in all countries the unconditional volatility of loan growth is 
higher than that of deposits; that is to say, in periods of monetary expansion loans 
grow by more than deposits while in periods of monetary contraction they fall by 
more than deposits. We also conduct vector auto regression analyses of the 
relationships between interest rates, bank deposits, bank lending, and nominal 
GDP and report the resulting impulse response functions for the relationship 
between interest rates, bank deposits, and bank lending. The results are far from 
clear cut, but they are consistent with the view that lending responds more 
strongly and often earlier than bank deposits to a shift in monetary policy. This 
implies that, if the deposits and loans of constrained banks behave similarly to 
those of the banking sector as a whole, then the bank lending channel will 
attenuate the impact of monetary policy. 
  Section 6 summarises our findings and provides some further discussion of 
the interaction between the bank lending channel and the closely related ‘bank 
capital channel’. The conventional exposition of the bank lending channel 
assumes that liquidity constraints do not alter in response to a shift in monetary 
policy. The ‘bank capital channel’ introduces the possibility that liquidity  
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constraints may become more binding following a tightening of monetary policy 
and become less binding following a loosening of monetary policy. Our analysis 
of the interaction between the bank lending channel and the bank capital channel 
also allows us to discuss the conduct of monetary policy in periods when the 
banking sector becomes critically undercapitalised, for example in Japan in the 
1990s, and worldwide following the ‘credit crunch’ of the summer of 2007. We 
find that undercapitalisation and expectations of continued low growth of bank 
income can reinforce the attenuation of monetary policy created by the bank 
lending channel, leading in the most extreme cases to a deflation which monetary 
policy alone is powerless to escape. 
 
 
2  The conventional view of the bank lending 
channel 
This section restates the theory of the bank lending channel and assesses the most 
widely cited empirical study of its size, sign, and importance. The original 
theoretical presentation is Bernanke and Blinder (1988). They assume that banks 
hold three assets – reserves, loans, and short term bonds – and issue one liability – 
bank deposits. Loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes, both as sources of 
finance to borrowers and as assets held in bank portfolios. In consequence the 
stock of bank credit depends on the spread between bank loan and bond market 
rates of interest. 
  Bernanke and Blinder then discuss the implications for monetary transmission 
in an ISLM setting, arguing that a tightening of monetary policy results not only 
in the standard leftward shift in the LM curve but also at the same time – as bank 
loan rates increase in response to the monetary policy tightening and thus reduce 
the supply of investible funds to the market – in a leftward shift in the IS curve. 
They argue that the impact of bank balance sheets is thus to amplify the 
transmission of monetary policy. They note that the IS curve will be affected by 
disturbances to the supply or demand for bank credit (both of which will affect 
bank loan rates independently of market rates of interest) and argue that credit 
stock targeting can be preferable to monetary targeting when money demand is 
relatively unstable compared to credit demand. 
  In Stein (1998), in contrast to Bernanke and Blinder (1988), it is bank liability 
management rather than bank asset management that plays a key role in monetary 
transmission. This is a more formal model of the capital market frictions limiting 
bank access to wholesale market funding. His banks hold two assets – reserves 
and loans – and issue two liabilities – insured deposits and wholesale market 
liabilities (eg certificates of deposit). He considers a separating equilibrium 
generated by adverse selection between smaller more opaque banks, unable to  
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access wholesale liabilities and therefore relying exclusively on deposits for 
funding their lending, and larger transparent banks, able to access additional 
wholesale liabilities freely at market rates of interest. 
  Stein (1998), like Bernanke and Blinder (1988), concludes that the impact of 
bank balance sheets on loan supply amplifies the impact of monetary policy, but 
his model predicts that this amplification will be limited to constrained banks that 
are unable to substitute wholesale finance for a monetary policy induced reduction 
in bank deposits. He also points out that for these constrained banks a disturbance 
to bank deposits, eg an inflow of deposits financed by sale of other assets, will 
affect the supply of bank credit. 
  A substantial empirical literature – reviewed in Appendix 1 – investigates the 
magnitude of this bank lending channel. This literature has reached a consensus 
on one point – that it is extremely difficult to separately identify the impacts of 
bank loan supply and bank loan demand using aggregate data. Therefore the more 
informative empirical studies use individual bank accounting data. It is however 
widely accepted that even with individual bank data it is a difficult to disentangle 
the impact of loan demand and loan supply. As a result there is not yet a 
consensus on the importance of the bank lending channel in monetary 
transmission. 
  The most widely cited of the micro-econometric studies of the bank lending 
channel is Kashyap and Stein (2000).
3 Their data comprise the US call report data 
available for all US commercial banks. This source provides Kayshap and Stein 
(op. cit.) with nearly one million bank-observations covering 1976Q2 to 1993Q2. 
Their specification seeks to control for the impact of bank loan demand by 
examining, in particular, differences in behaviour between large and small banks. 
  They apply a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage they estimate 
cross-sectional regressions of the change in the log of bank lending, using four 
lags of the dependent variable together with Federal Reserved district dummy 
variable and the lagged value of the ratio of securities plus federal funds sold to 
total assets (their bank liquidity ratio). In the second stage they conduct univariate 
times series regressions, regressing the coefficient on the bank liquidity ratio – 
estimated from the first-stage cross-sections for each time period – on the current 
and four lagged values of a measure of the stance of monetary policy plus a linear 
time trend and also (in an extended bivariate specification) on the current and four 
lagged values of the growth of GNP. 
                                                 
3 While we reinterpret their results, we must praise the highly professional attitude taken by 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) towards the public dissemination of their data. They went to 
considerable lengths to correct for breaks in the call report data. The documentation of their data 
work together with the complete and updated US call report data is maintained on the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago website. This resource offers the opportunity for further research, testing 
directly the relationship between bank funding and monetary transmission.  
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  They conduct this estimation procedure for two measures of bank lending, 
commercial and industrial loans and total loans, and for three alternative 
indicators of the stance of monetary policy: the negative of the Federal-Funds 
rate; the Boschen-Mills (1995) indicator of the stance of monetary policy based on 
the reading of FOMC documents; and the Bernake-Mihov (1998) indicator of the 
stance of monetary policy based on a general VaR specification (in all cases a 
higher value of the monetary policy indicator represents a loosening of monetary 
policy.) They also estimate separately for three different size classes of banks: 
small banks falling in the 0–95th percentile of the size distribution; middle sized 
banks falling in the 95–99th percentiles of the size distribution; and large banks in 
the 99–100th percentile, and for both their univariate (monetary policy only) and 
bivariate (monetary policy plus GNP growth) second stage specifications. 
  Their discussion highlights the sum of the second stage coefficients on the 
current and lagged indicator of the stance of monetary policy, reported in their 
Table 3 page 417. They find that for large banks the sum of these coefficients is 
always positive and in most cases statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level ie 
following episodes of monetary policy tightening (when the monetary policy 
indicators are negative) there is a negative relationship between liquidity and 
growth of bank lending (so large banks with more liquid balance sheets are 
revealed to have reduced their lending by more than large banks with less liquid 
balance sheets). For small banks they obtain precisely the opposite result, the sum 
of the second stage coefficients on the indicator of the stance of monetary policy 
is always negative and mostly statistically significant. For both large and small 
banks these coefficient estimates are larger and of even greater statistical 
significance in the bivariate version of the second stage specification, including 
also current and lagged GNP growth. For commercial and industrial lending the 
difference in the sum of coefficients between small and large banks, is always 
statistically significant at the 1% level. For total lending the difference in 
coefficients is statistically significant at this level only in the bi-variate 
specification, not in the univariate specification. 
  Kashyap and Stein (2000) summarise their results as follows (page 425): 
‘Within the class of small banks changes in monetary policy matter much more 
for the lending of those banks with the least liquid balance sheets.’ They place 
particular emphasis on the major coefficient differences between large and small 
banks, on the grounds that loan supply effects should be relatively unimportant for 
large banks and hence that the difference in estimates between small and large 
banks are a relatively clean estimate of loan supply impacts uncontaminated by 
the impact of loan demand. They conclude that their analysis reveals strong 
empirical support for a statistically and quantitatively important link between 
bank liquidity and bank loan supply of the kind set out in Stein (1998) ie that the 
bank lending channel does amplify monetary policy transmission.  
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  Do the findings of Kashyap and Stein (2000) resolve the question of whether 
the bank lending channel amplifies or attenuates the impact of monetary policy? 
The answer is no, they do not. Their findings, while consistent with the view that 
small financially constrained banks are forced to respond more to changes in 
monetary policy than are small financially unconstrained banks, can readily be re-
interpreted as reflecting an entirely different mechanism. Many small banks, for 
reasons of either commercial interest or concern for the welfare of their 
customers, offer implicit hedging of loan interest rate risk. Such banks will 
maintain narrow interest margins and offer their customers relatively cheap 
lending facilities during periods of tight monetary policy, in return for offering 
somewhat less generous lending rates, and operating with relatively high interest 
margins, during periods of loose monetary policy. Only small banks with strong 
community presence and ongoing rather than transient customer relationships can 
operate in this way. Such banks can be expected also to hold a relatively high 
proportion of liquid assets, to permit the resulting variability of their net interest 
income over time. This is a simple alternative explanation of the Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) finding that more liquid small banks respond less to monetary policy 
that less liquid small banks, but this explanation has nothing to do with the impact 
of financial constraints of the bank lending channel. Their research, while 
providing valuable insight into bank behavior, provides no conclusive evidence on 
the sign of the bank lending channel.
4 
  Can the results of Kashyap and Stein (2000) and other related studies be 
interpreted as arising because liquidity constraints bind more tightly during 
periods of monetary contraction and less tightly during periods of monetary 
expansion? The empirical tests conducted in this literature are inappropriate for 
testing this hypothesis. If monetary policy is amplified by a tightening of bank 
liquidity constraints then the largest impact should not be observed for the 
smallest, most illiquid, and least capitalized banks, since these are already the 
most severely liquidity constrained, but for banks at intermediate levels of size, 
liquidity, or capitalization for whom liquidity constraints begin to bind. 
 
                                                 
4 Kashyap and Stein (2000) were aware of this possible bias. On pages 415–416 they note that the 
difference in coefficient estimates for small banks could reflect not amplification of monetary 
policy via the bank lending channel but heterogenous risk aversion, with some relatively 
‘conservative’ banks responding less to monetary policy and at the same time operating a more 
liquid balance sheet, in comparison to other less ‘conservative’ banks. Their defense against this 
criticism is to argue (a) that there is another bias running in the opposite direction, with some 
banks with relatively cyclically sensitive portfolios also preferring to hold a more liquid balance 
sheet (b) with the further maintained assumption that large banks can never be liquidity 
constrained, their finding that the lending of large liquid banks respond more to monetary policy 
than that of large illiquid banks shows that the second of these two biases dominates the first. 
However this does not settle the matter since it is possible that even large banks can be liquidity 
constrained. In this case the observed coefficients estimates for large banks could arise because 
there is an attenuation of the monetary policy response of  less liquid large banks.  
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3  The role of bank reserves in monetary policy 
This section explains our decision to assume that the instrument of monetary 
policy is the short term interest rate, with required reserves responding passively 
to changes in deposits. Reserve requirements do not matter for the transmission of 
monetary policy, at least in developed financial systems. They are effectively a 
tax on commercial banking operations, with the tax rate depending on the extent 
that they are unremunerated, the level of short term interest rates, and the excess 
reserves they lead banks to hold over what they would hold from commercial 
prudence. But the level of this tax is too small to make much difference to banks 
choice of assets and liabilities and in any case central banks in developed financial 
markets do not alter required reserve ratios as part of their conduct of monetary 
policy. Banks determine their lending and funding decisions according to their 
view and those of the financial markets on the future course of market interest 
rates; and also on the ability of banks to obtain finance from these markets and the 
terms on which this finance is made available. 
  In our analysis of monetary transmission we could assume that either the 
supply of reserves or the short term rate of interest is the policy instrument. The 
level of short term policy rates r determines the demand for bank deposits D(r) 
and hence, for a required reserve ratio of β, the demand for reserves R(r) = β D(r) 
with the central bank. Provided this function R(r) is one-to-one mapping then any 
monetary policy can be described either in terms of movements in reserves or of 
short term interest rates. It a matter only of modelling convenience which 
approach is used. Applied correctly both must yield the same answer. 
  The choice of monetary instrument, between a monetary stock (whether the 
monetary base or some broader measure of money) or an interest rate (whether 
overnight or at some longer time horizon), is not just a matter of convenience in a 
stochastic setting. If economic relationships are disturbed by shocks that arrive 
after the decision over the monetary policy instrument is made, then one 
instrument may be more successful than another in achieving the ultimate policy 
target (see Poole, 1970). This important insight does not matter to our analysis, 




                                                 
5 The supply of reserves by the central bank also plays a further important role in stressed market 
situations, for example following those following the 9/11 terrorist attacks or in the wake of the 
credit crisis of the summer of 2007, which produce a sudden and unanticipated increase in demand 
for safe liquid assets. In these situations the central bank must by a classic lender of last resort 
operation provide additional liquidity in order to maintain confidence in bank liabilities. Such 
liquidity shocks do not need to be  modelled in order to understand the role of banks in monetary 
transmission, for the central bank response is explicitly intended to prevent any change in 
monetary policy stance.  
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4  An alternative view: bank balance sheets as an 
attenuator of monetary policy transmission 
This section examines how changes in monetary policy, operating through the 
policy interest rate (denoted by r), affect both the volumes of bank loans, deposits 
and wholesale funding (denoted by L, D and W) and bank interest rates on these 
assets and liabilities (denoted by rL, rD, and rW). Banks compete with financial 
markets on both sides of their balance sheets and so a change in the market rate of 
interest directly affects both the demand for bank loans and the supply of deposits 
and wholesale funds. We show that in this case bank balance sheet constraints can 
attenuate monetary policy transmission. 
  Our aim is to extend an otherwise standard model in order to analyse the 
impact of the aggregate level of interest rates on bank funding (Appendix 2 
provides a fuller exposition). For this task it is appropriate to work with a reduced 
form model in which the interest rate coefficients reflect both the direct and 
indirect impacts of monetary policy on bank funding flows (the direct impacts are 
the standard interest elasticities for the demand for lending and the supply of 
deposit and wholesale funding; the indirect effects are those additional impacts of 
interest rates on bank funding that arise for a number of other reasons, for 
example improved cash flows or net worth of bank borrowers or changes in 
expectations about future aggregate demand and output, leading customers to 
borrow more from banks or to increase their bank deposits). Empirical evidence 
suggests that the direct response of bank loan demand to long term interest rates is 
rather small, but this is consistent with our analysis. 
  Since we are concerned only with the impact of small movements of interest 
rates we can assume constant interest-semi elasticities (exponential functions) of 
aggregate reduced form demand for lending and aggregate reduced form supply of 
wholesale and insured deposit funding, allowing us to use a version of the 
standard Klein-Monti model of banking competition to model the impact of the 
policy rate r on the banking sector.
6 
  There are N identical banks, indexed by n, in Cournot quantity competition. 
As in Stein (1998), we distinguish four assets and liabilities in the balance sheet 
identity for bank n
7 
 
n n n n W D R L + = +  (4.1) 
 
                                                 
6 Klein (1971), Monti (1972). We follow closely the exposition in Freixas and Rochet (1997) 
chapter 3. 
7 This focus on liability management and the use of wholesale funding is not material to our 
argument, we could equally well adopt the Bernanke and Blinder assumption that the banks hold 
liquid assets (bonds) and make no use of wholesale borrowing.  
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These assets and liabilities are 
 
L
n =  loans 
R
n  =  non-interest bearing required reserves, responding passively to the reserve 




n = insured  deposits 
W
n  =  other funding, including equity capital and wholesale debt finance. 
 
We assume the following equations for the aggregate volumes of banking sector 
loans, deposits, and wholesale finance 
 





n − ε − ν − = = ∑ =  (4.2a) 
 





n − ε ν = = ∑ =  (4.2b) 
 





n − ε ν = = ∑ =  (4.2c) 
 
The loans of different banks are perfect substitutes for each other ie borrowers 
may be bank dependent but they are not dependent on individual banks. Similarly 
there is perfect substitutability between the deposits of different banks and also 
between the wholesale liabilities of different banks. Perfect substitutability 
implies, as shown in equations (4.2a, 4.2b, 4.2c), that aggregate assets and 
liabilities are functions of the monetary policy rate r and sector wide bank interest 
rates on loans, deposits and wholesale funding. 








n W r D r L r − − = π  (4.3) 
 
taking account of the impact of their borrowing and lending on bank interest rates 
(through (4.2a), (4.2b), (4.2c)) and subject to the balance sheet constraint (4.1) 
and the reserve requirement R
n =β D
n. 
  Before discussing the equilibrium outcome, we comment on the key 
parameters. Three elasticity parameters – εL,  εD and εW – capture the 
substitutability of bank and non-bank assets and liabilities. The parameter εL 
reflects the extent to which borrowers are bank dependent. In the limiting case 
εL↑∞ borrowers can perfectly substitute other sources of finance eg commercial 
paper or bond issuance, and bank loan rates have no impact on borrower credit 
and money transmission. As we establish shortly, a necessary condition for the 
existence of a bank lending channel is that the sum of these elasticities is finite: 
εL + εD + εW < ∞, ie not only are bank borrowers ‘bank dependent’ but also banks  
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themselves face rising costs of funding as they expand deposit and wholesale 
liabilities. 
  These parameters determine how the volume of aggregate banking sector 
assets and liabilities respond to the various margins between the market interest 
rate r and the rates on bank instruments. The standard Klein-Monti model is a 
limiting case where εW↑+∞. In this case wholesale funding to the banking sector 
is available in infinitely elastic supply (no banks are financially constrained) and 
can fully substitute for any variations in the supply of deposits (ie change in D0) 
or fully match any variation in the demand for bank lending (ie a change in L0). 
  We further amend the standard Klein-Monti model by introducing a monetary 
policy (market interest rate) impact on aggregate bank assets and liabilities, 
through the parameters νL, νD and νW. We think of these as a shorthand for the 
impact of market interest rates (monetary policy) on aggregate, economy wide, 
flow of funds, both for retail investors and wholesale market participants. A 
structural interpretation of our model suggests a priori that these three parameters 
all have positive signs. In the event of a monetary policy tightening the 
intertemporal shift of consumption and investment expenditures (with reduced 
expenditure today and higher expenditure in future periods) can be expected to 
lead to a decline of both bank and market financing and an increase in both retail 
and wholesale portfolios. However it is possible that in reduced form the indirect 
impact of a tightening monetary policy could lead to an net decline of bank 
deposits ie the sign of νD and νW is ultimately an empirical matter. The relative 
magnitude of these latter parameters is not critical, although we expect in a small 
open economy that νW < νD because wholesale funds are collected on a global 
market which is scarcely (and for many countries not at all) affected by domestic 
interest rates. 
  The first order conditions for bank profit maximisation with respect to balance 
sheet volumes are the following interest rate margin equations, where margins 
depend upon aggregate demand elasticities and the number of banks (these 
equations are derived in Appendix 2, note that the reserve requirement β, because 
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These two margin equations, together with the banking sector balance sheet 
identity (4.1), determine the three endogenous bank interest rates and hence 
banking sector equilibrium. 
  The limiting case in which εW↑+∞, provides the benchmark for assessing both 
the sign and magnitude of the bank lending channel. In this special case banks 
access an infinitely elastic supply of wholesale funding for bank lending and 
hence bank wholesale rates always equal short term market rates (rW = r) and both 
bank loan rates and bank deposit rates move in line with market rates. Since the 
margins between bank loan and deposit rates and market rates are unaffected by 
monetary policy, bank balance sheets then neither amplify nor attenuate the 
impact of monetary policy, and the reduction in bank lending is determined solely 
by the demand for bank lending as determined by the aggregate interest rate loan 
demand elasticity νL. 
  We compare against this benchmark the response of bank lending to changes 
in monetary policy when banks have only limited access to wholesale finance and 
hence are liquidity constrained. When banks are liquidity constrained then there is 
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Assuming an exponential supply of wholesale funding this shadow price is given 
(see Appendix 2) by 
 
) N ) W / W (ln( ) (
1 0 n 1
W w
− − + ν + ε = λ  (4.5) 
 
ie this shadow price depends on the interest rate elasticity of the supply of 
wholesale funding, on the volume of wholesale funding utilized relative to what is 
available, as well as on the number of banks competing for wholesale funds. In 
line with the previous literature on the bank lending channel we assume that 
liquidity constraints are not directly affected by shifts of monetary policy ie that 
W0,  εW, and νW all remain constant. Section 6 discusses the possibility that 
monetary policy may directly affect liquidity constraints for example a tightening 
of monetary policy might alter wholesale funding available to banks W
0, perhaps 
because of an impact of monetary policy on bank capital. 
  Equation (4.2a) indicates that, relative to the standard benchmark, the 
direction of the bank lending channel depends on the direction of change of the 
interest rate margin rL–r .If this margin increases, following a monetary policy 
tightening, then the bank lending channel amplifies the impact of monetary policy 
on bank lending (the Bernanke-Blinder, 1988; and Stein, 1998, prediction.) If this 
margin decreases then the impact on bank lending is attenuated. 
  The response of this margin depends upon a simple condition that emerges 
directly from the solution of the model. Consider an increase in short term market 
rates of interest of Δr. From equations (4.4a) and (4.4b) it is apparent that all bank  
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interest rates move together ΔrL = ΔrD = ΔrW: As shown in Appendix 2, in order to 
maintain the aggregate banking sector balance sheet constraint, the response of 
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where the strict equality obtains under our prior that all the various parameters 
(νL, νD, νW, εL, εD, εW) are positive and finite ie our priors imply – contrary to 
Bernanke-Blinder (1988) and Stein (1998) – that the bank loan- market rate 
interest margin declines following a tightening of monetary policy and therefore 
that the bank lending channel attenuates the impact of monetary policy. 
  The economic intuition underlying (4.6) has already been outlined in our 
introduction. Suppose that market interest rates and bank interest rates increase in 
line with market rates of interest ie that ΔrL = ΔrD = ΔrW = Δr > 0. In this case 
loans decline by νLL while deposits (net of reserves) increase by νDD(1–β) and 
wholesale bank funding increases by νWW. But this leaves banks with an excess 
of funding (loans have declined while both deposits and wholesale funding have 
increased) so this cannot be an equilibrium (the only exception is if one of these 
three assets and liabilities is in infinitely elastic supply in which case a small 
change in an interest margin can restore the banking sector balance sheet 
constraint.) In order to restore the banking sector balance sheet constraint, the 
banks must absorb this additional funding, and to do this they lower the various 
bank interest rates in order to generate greater loan demand and reduce the 
volume of deposit and wholesale finance. This excess funding available to banks 
when monetary policy is tightened leads to a reduction in the bank loan – market 
rate of interest margin rL–r and this in turn explains why the bank lending channel 
can be expected to attenuate, rather than amplify, the impact of monetary policy 
on bank lending. 
  The Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Stein (1998) prediction that the bank 
lending channel amplifies the impact of monetary policy on bank lending emerges 
under alternative parameter assumptions, when
8 
 
0 W ) 1 ( D L W D L < ν + β − ν + ν  (4.7) 
 
in which case a monetary tightening leads to an outflow of bank funds and an 
increase in the reduction in the bank loan – market rate of interest margin rL–r. 
                                                 
8 Stein assumes that a subset of banks are unable to access wholesale funding at all, in which case 
the relevant condition is that for these banks: νLL + νDD(1–β) < 0.  
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  If our analysis is correct, and the sign of the bank lending channel is indeed 
theoretically ambiguous, then there must be expositional mistakes in these 
previous models. With the additional insight provided by our own model, these 
mistakes are easily located 
 
–  Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argue that since bank loan rates rise when 
interest rates are tightened the IS curve must be shifted to the left by a 
tightening of monetary policy. This misleads because it does not recognize 
that in the standard ISLM model, when bank balance sheets have no impact 
on monetary policy, bank loan interest rates move in line with market rates of 
interest. If bank loan rates respond more than one for one to changes in 
market rates of interest then the IS curve moves to the left following a 
monetary tightening. If, as we argue is more likely to be the case, and is 
undeniably possible, bank loan rates respond less than one for one to market 
rates of interest then the IS curve moves to the right and the impact of 
monetary policy is attenuated. 
–  Stein (1998) argues that following a monetary tightening constrained banks 
are unable to replace a loss of deposits with wholesale finance and hence must 
reduce their lending by more than unconstrained banks. This argument is 
flawed, relying as it does on the unstated assumption that banks lose more 
deposits than loans following a monetary tightening. .If as we argue there is a 
deposit inflow following a tightening of monetary policy there is instead a 
reduction of demand for wholesale funding by constrained banks and once 
again the impact of monetary policy is attenuated. 
 
We have reached our conclusions using a very simple model of banking 
equilibrium. Does the same conclusion still hold under alternative specifications 
of banking competition? A problem with using the basic Klein-Monti 
specification is that all banks are funding constrained to the same degree. 
Appendix 2 explores a more general model, relaxing the Klein-Monti assumption 
that the deposits (and the loans) of different banks are perfect substitutes, and 
instead assuming imperfect substitution between the loan and deposit products of 
different banks, with elasticities of substitution of ηL and ηD. 
  This second specification allows us to develop a version of the model 
corresponding more closely to Stein (1998), with two groups of banks one 
constrained the other unconstrained. With the assumption that νL > 0 we reach the 
same conclusion as before ie that the impact of financially constraints on banks is 
to attenuate the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. The Stein (1998) 
results are restored only if, following a rise of interest rates, there is a deposit 
outflow from financially constrained banks that exceeds the decline in demand for 
their lending.  
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  In our model the margins between bank interest rates (the right hand side of 
the first order conditions (4.4a) and (4.4b)) remain constant. There are several 
reasons for thinking that bank loan supply might increase and loan margins 
contract in a monetary policy expansion (or bank loan supply might reduce and 
loan margins increase in a monetary policy contraction.) Reasons for expecting 
such a loan supply amplification of monetary policy include the following 
 
(i)  a monetary policy expansion might promote greater competition between 
banks, and a narrowing of bank margins, as they attempt to claim an 
increased share of an expanding market. 
(ii)  structural shifts in banking competition can also have monetary policy 
implications. For example, the liberalization of banking markets and the 
rapid innovation in structured credit markets since the mid-1980s has 
increased bank access to wholesale funding, thus reducing interest margins 
and contributed to relatively rapid growth of the stock of bank credit. It is 
possible that monetary policy might affect the pace of such structural 
change, by reducing the costs of bank funding and increasing loan supply 
in a monetary expansion. 
(iii)  monetary policy might affect banks’ assessments of their portfolio risks. 
Following a monetary policy expansion banks may consider default less 
likely and be willing to lend at lower interest margins. 
 
Such loan supply effects may play an important role in monetary transmission. 
Such supply shifts also help to explain why it is relatively difficult to predict the 
response of bank lending to changes of interest rates. But these loan supply effects 
do not alter our main finding, that financially constrained banks will respond less 
than unconstrained banks to shifts in monetary policy if a monetary tightening 
leads to a net inflow of funding (lending falling more than deposits) and so 
reduces their funding requirements. 
  There is however a possibility that a monetary policy tightening might reduce 
the book net worth or the market capitalization of financially constrained banks 
and hence reduce the amount of wholesale funding available (at a given cost of 
funding rW). This ‘bank capital channel’ could in some circumstances 
substantially reduce W0 in equation (4.5) have a major impact on the supply of 
bank loans. This mechanism might offset or even reverse the impact of the bank 
lending channel as modeled in this section. We discuss this possibility in our 




5  Evidence provided by aggregate data 
This section examines the response of bank deposits and lending to monetary 
policy changes, as revealed by aggregate data on bank lending, bank deposits, 
GDP and interest rates for the G8 countries.
9 
  Figure 1, panels (a)–(h), present aggregate macroeconomic and banking data, 
detrended using the Hoderick-Prescott filter. There is less consistency of 
definition for these banking variables across countries than for the 
macroeconomic variables. The banking data are also affected by both reporting 
problems and by structural changes in the banking industry. Nonetheless some 
conclusions can be drawn, about whether monetary policy increases or reduces the 
demand by the banking sector for wholesale funding, and hence on the likely sign 
of the bank lending channel 
 
–  For the seven countries where a comparison can be made (we do not have a 
long enough time series for the UK) sight deposits fluctuate very much more 
than total bank deposits. This suggests that, while it may be true that a 
tightening of monetary policy can reduce holdings of sight deposits, most of 
this impact is a shift between sight and time deposits with a relatively small 
overall effect on bank wholesale funding requirements. 
–  For all eight countries bank lending fluctuates pro-cyclically and with these 
movements either co-incident, or (eg in the United States) slightly leading 
movements in real and nominal GDP. 
–  In six of the eight countries (the exceptions are France and Italy) the cyclical 
movements in total bank deposits occur at about the same time and in the 
same direction as the movements in nominal and real GDP, with some 
indication eg for the US that the deposit movements lag those of bank 
lending. In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (but 
not in Germany or Japan) the amplitude of the cyclical deposit movements 
appear to be somewhat less than those of total bank deposits. This suggests 
that movements in bank funding requirements over the business cycle, 
whether induced by monetary policy or by aggregate shocks, are procyclical 
and relatively small. If the bank funding movements of liquidity constrained 
banks are similar then the bank lending channel will have a relatively small 
attenuating impact on monetary transmission over the course of the business 
cycle. 
                                                 
9 Our data sources, together with a number of adjustments to the banking data to correct for both 
reporting breaks and seasonality, are described in Appendix 3  
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Figure 1.  Aggregate data, HP trend adjusted 
 




































–  In both France (during the 1980s and early 1990s) and in Italy (during the 
1990s), there are substantial differences in the cyclical movements in bank 
deposits and in bank lending, indicating that in these two countries during 
these periods there have been some relatively large shifts in bank funding 
requirements. But there is no obvious consistent pattern to these movements 
and in the case of France the overall magnitude of the cyclical fluctuations 
again appears somewhat smaller for deposits than for loans. 
–  These charts also display the movements in a measure of real interest rates 
(the nominal market rate of interest less the rate of growth in the smoothed 
nominal GDP from the Hoderick-Prescott Filter). This also moves pro-
cyclically, indicating that it is difficult to disentangle the impact on bank loans 
and deposits of interest rates from the impact of cyclical movements in 
nominal and real output. While deposits typically do rise during periods when 
real interest rates are rising, we cannot say simply from visual inspection 
whether this is due to an interest rate impact or simply an increase in the 
demand for deposits driven by real and nominal income growth. Our prior, 
that monetary tightening reduces the level of deposits, cannot be tested from 
this visual inspection. 
 
As an alternative way of comparing the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations, we 
estimated, allowing for correlation between the error terms, the following 
bivariate regressions for aggregate bank loans and total bank deposits 
 
L 3 3
2 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1
D ln
D ln D ln L ln L ln L ln L ln
ε + Δ β +
Δ β + Δ β + Δ α + Δ α + Δ α = Δ
−
− − − − −  (5.1a) 
 
D 3 3
2 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1
L ln
L ln L ln D ln D ln D ln D ln
ε + Δ δ +
Δ δ + Δ δ + Δ γ + Δ γ + Δ γ = Δ
−
− − − − −  (5.1b) 
 
Table 1 reports the resulting standard errors (for changes in the log) of both 
aggregate bank deposits and aggregate bank loans obtained from these regressions 
for the eight countries. Single period standard errors (rows (1) and (2)) are similar 
for loans and deposits, but in order to examine cyclical volatility it is more 
appropriate to look at the unconditional standard errors, allowing for the impact of 
the estimated dynamics from the lagged dependent variables and correlation of 
residuals. Comparison of these unconditional standard errors (whether single 
equation, reported in rows (3) and (4) or joint equation, reported in rows (5) and 
(6)) provides an alternative quantitative comparison of the magnitude of cyclical 
fluctuations in deposits and lending. This comparison is consistent with the visual 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the growth rate of bank lending than in the growth rate of bank deposits, for all 
countries except Italy and (when comparing joint unconditional standard errors) 
Japan. 
  Table 1 also reports p-values for a Granger causality test, for both the impact 
of lagged deposits on lending growth and of lagged lending on deposit growth. 
These show that in six of the eight countries lagged growth of lending is 
statistically significant (at the five per cent level) in predicting the growth of bank 
deposits while in four of the eight countries lagged deposits are statistically 
significant in predicting the growth of bank lending. However, while providing 
some evidence that changes in bank deposits may affect bank lending, this 
bivariate specification does not distinguish a relationship arising because of 
balance sheet funding constraints from a shock affecting bank customer demand. 
  Finally, in order to investigate the impact of macroeconomic developments on 
bank balance sheets, we estimated a vector auto regression model for all eight 
countries using the sample period 1975q1–2007q2 with four variables: the level of 
nominal interest rates (i), and the rates of growth of aggregate bank deposits 
(ΔlnD), aggregate bank lending (ΔlnL), and of nominal GDP (ΔlnY
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and with orthogonal shocks. ie our VaR has the ordering ΔlnD, ΔlnL, ΔlnY
n, i.
11 
  Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions obtained from this vector 
autoregression. These show a statistically significant response of bank lending to 
monetary policy in five of the eight countries (the United States, Germany, 
France, Australia, and Canada, but a statistically significant response of total bank 
deposits to monetary policy only in Italy There is a response on the 95% threshold 
in both Germany and Australia, but in the case of Germany this is quickly 
reversed (the VaR estimates appear to have imaginary roots) and in Australia the 
                                                 
10 We avoided using the first five years of the sample because of the very substantial negative real 
interest rates found (in Figure 1) for 1970–1974, suggesting that the relationship between bank 
balance sheets, nominal GDP, and interest rates cannot have been structurally stable over this early 
period. 
11 In any VaR analysis the results can be very sensitive to the ordering of variables. We found it 
difficult to get any meaningful results if the interest rate i preceded any of the other variables (for 
example if i precedes ΔlnL we found that a positive shock to interest rates resulted in an 
immediate rise in bank lending, a result which presumably reflects a monetary policy reaction to 
rising bank lending not a structural relationship), but provided the interest rate i appears last in the 
ordering, changing the order of the remaining variables made relatively little difference to the 
results.  
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response occurs after a long lag. In the case of both Japan and the United 
Kingdom there is no evidence of any statistically significant response of the 
banking sector to monetary policy at all. Thus for only one of the eight countries – 
Italy – is characterization of the behaviour of aggregate bank balance sheets 
consistent with a tightening of monetary policy increasing bank funding 
constraints. 
  The impulse responses also report the response of bank lending to a shock to 
total deposits. On a one-period basis this appears consistent with a bank lending 
channel, because a shock to bank deposits results in a one period increase in bank 
lending, but this is not sustained and in any case could be interpreted as a demand 
shock to lending being financed out of increases in the entire balance sheet, from 
deposits as well as wholesale sources of funding. Finally we report the impact of 
interest rates on the growth of nominal incomes. In the four English speaking 
countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada there is a 
statistically significant reduction in the growth of nominal GDP following a shock 
to interest rates, after a lag of two to three quarters. 
  These vector autoregressions do not provide a clear-cut answer as to whether 
a tightening of monetary policy increases or reduces bank funding constraints, but 
they are consistent with our inspection of the detrended aggregate data and the 
standard errors from our estimated bi-variate regressions. Of the eight G8 
countries, only for Italy do we find any evidence that aggregate bank deposits 
respond more than aggregate bank lending, either over the business cycle or in 
response to a shift of monetary policy. In most countries the behaviour of 
aggregate bank deposits over the business cycle can be explained by 
contemporaneous movements of nominal and real GDP. While this means that a 
tightening of monetary policy can reduce banking sector deposits, bank lending 
falls at the same time and the overall effect of monetary policy does not appear to 




Figure 2.  Orthogonalised impulse response functions 
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It has been widely accepted that constraints on the wholesale funding of bank 
balance sheets amplify the transmission of monetary policy through what is called 
the ‘bank lending channel’. We show that the effect of such bank balance sheet 
constraints on monetary transmission is in fact theoretically ambiguous, with an 
amplifying effect only when a tightening of monetary policy leads to a net 
outflow of funds, ie deposit outflow exceeding the decline of lending, in 
constrained banks. But if a tightening of monetary policy leads to a net inflow of 
funds into constrained banks then the bank lending channel attenuates the impact 
of monetary policy. 
  We examine macroeconomic data for the G8 countries and find no evidence 
that banking sector deposits respond negatively and more than lending to 
tightening of monetary policy, as the accepted view of the bank lending channel 
requires. The overall picture is mixed but these data generally suggest that 
deposits fluctuate procyclically and somewhat less over the business cycle than 
bank  lending, and that total bank deposits, unlike bank lending, show little direct 
response to changes in interest rates. Shifts in monetary policy thus affect bank 
lending more than they affect bank deposits, and therefore, to the extent that 
banks are balance sheet constrained, the bank lending channel will attenuate not 
amplify the response of bank lending to monetary policy. While it is possible that 
the asset and liability response for some individual banks might be different, (for 
example a bank whose loan business is focused in markets that are relatively 
interest rate insensitive), the evidence we have examined suggests it is very 
unlikely that the bank lending channel amplifies monetary policy when the entire 
banking sector, and not just a section of it, is considered. Our paper has thus 
corrected a misunderstanding about the role of banks in monetary policy 
transmission that has persisted in the literature for some two decades. 
  The principal argument that can be made against this conclusion is as follows. 
Our analysis shows that, in theory, the bank lending channel can either amplify or 
attenuate the transmission of monetary policy. However the balance of available 
empirical evidence suggests that in practice a tightening of monetary policy 
reduces the amount of available to banks from wholesale markets and the 
resulting increase in liquidity constraints will amplify the impact of monetary 
policy on bank lending. Therefore, while the ‘bank lending channel’ may not 
operate exactly as described in the literature, it still provides a reasonable and 
tractable characterisation of monetary policy transmission. 
  It may be true that a tightening of monetary policy, on at least some 
occasions, increases bank liquidity constraints, but this is not the mechanism 
explored in the literature on the bank lending channel. To avoid confusion this 
should therefore be called something different. We believe that the appropriate  
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name is the ‘bank financial accelerator’ since the underlying idea is essentially the 
same as in the corporate financial accelerator, that deterioration in net worth (or 
other measures of balance sheet strength) leads to a reduction in both assets and 
liabilities. 
  In terms of our theoretical model presented in Section 4, we can think of the 
bank financial accelerator as a tightening of monetary policy reducing W0 (the 
supply of bank wholesale funding) in our equation (4.5). We can see from 
equations (4.4) and (4.5) that such a reduction in W0 will then raise the shadow 
price of internal funds, increase the margin between bank interest rates and market 
rates, and hence both reduce the stock of bank lending L and increase the stock of 
bank deposits D. 
  Even when allowing for this mechanism, our analysis still has important 
implications for the conduct of empirical tests for the role of bank balance sheets 
in monetary transmission. Many empiricial papers have followed the example of 
Kashyap and Stein (2000), seeking to test for the presence of the bank lending 
channel by interacting various bank balance sheet measures (size, liquidity, 
capitalisation, either measured directly or using these variables to allocate banks 
into different categories) with a measure of the stance of monetary policy. These 
papers have tested the hypotheses that smaller, less liquid, and less well 
capitalised banks respond relatively more than other banks to changes in monetary 
policy. Our analysis implies that the bank lending channel may play a  role in 
monetary policy transmission even when this hypothesis is rejected (as it often is, 
the literature is far from reaching any consensus about the sign and magnitude of 
such bank-balance sheet monetary policy interactions). 
  The appropriate way to test for the presence of the bank lending channel 
arising because of differences in behaviour between constrained and 
unconstrained banks is to examine the hypothesis that banks constrained by 
reasons of size, liquidity, or capitalisation exhibit a relatively strong relationship 
between deposit inflows and loan growth compared to other unconstrained banks. 
If this is the case then there will be an amplifying or attenuating impact on 
monetary policy transmission according to whether a monetary tightening reduces 
or increases deposits at these constrained banks. 
  A quite different test is needed to test for the presence of a bank financial 
accelerator. Here it must be shown that a decline in measures of bank size, 
liquidity, or book or market capitalisation results in an increase in liquidity 
constraints and a decline of bank lending. 
  To conclude our paper we briefly discuss the literature on the bank capital 
channel and argue that, just like the bank lending channel, the bank lending 
channel yields no clear theoretical prediction about transmission of monetary 
policy. In at least some circumstances it attenuates rather than amplify monetary 
policy ie the prevailing view that bank balance sheets amplify the impact of 
monetary policy transmission must still be rejected. We argue moreover that this  
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point is important to formulating an appropriate policy response to the current 
‘credit crunch’ affecting the global banking system. 
  There is a fairly extensive literature on the bank capital channel. Theoretical 
contributions, for example Holstrom and Tirole (1997), show that the availability 
of bank capital can limit the extent to which banks provide monitored credit. But 
these analyses assume that bank capital is exogenous; they do not incorporate any 
link between monetary policy and bank capital. In other contributions (for 
example Diamond and Rajan (2001), bank capital is endogenous. but these 
models explain long term desired capitalisation, not the effects of monetary policy 
on bank capital and the resulting impact on bank loan supply. 
  Perhaps most relevant is the now fairly extensive literature on the dynamics of 
bank capital buffers, protecting the bank against the potential costs of illiquidity 
and recapitalisation.
12 Banks hold a margin of capital as a buffer for absorbing 
fluctuations in earnings and asset values resulting from monetary policy, 
macroeconomic, market or other developments. In normal periods of operation 
these fluctuations will be within the expected range of outcomes, in which case 
bank capital will not then much affect the supply of bank lending. But 
occasionally such losses may be much bigger than anticipated and it is then that 
the availability of bank capital is likely to affect the supply of lending. 
  The bank capital channel can create pro-cyclical fluctuations in bank lending. 
In a recession, when bank capital – measured on either a balance sheet or market 
value basis – falls below desired levels then this can trigger a reduction in 
available wholesale funding which in turn reduces the supply of bank lending. It is 
also now well understood that countercyclical changes in bank capital 
requirements (for example those that are introduced by the Basel II accord) may 
exacerbate these cyclical fluctations in bank loan supply.
13 But the impact of 
monetary policy on bank loan supply via the bank capital channel, just like the 
impact of bank monetary policy via the bank lending channel, is theoretically 
ambiguous. 
  The bank capital channel impact of monetary policy is ambiguous because 
bank net worth, whether measured in book or market values, may either rise or 
fall following a loosening of monetary policy. This point is obvious for book 
value capital. A loosening of monetary policy lowers short term interest rates 
relative to long term rates, and to the extent that banks operate using short term 
                                                 
12 Theoretical models of such ‘buffer stock’ holdings of bank capital include Passmore and Sharpe 
(1994), Baglioni and Cherubini (1994); Calem and Rob (1996); Froot and Stein (1998); Milne and 
Whalley (1999); Milne (2002); Van Den Heuvel (2002); Milne and Whalley (2003); Milne (2004); 
Van den Huevel (2004); Estrella (2004); Puera and Keppo (2006); and Zhu (2006) as a well as a 
small empirical literature (see Jokipii and Milne (2008) for an empirical contribution and further 
citations). 
13 Kilponen and Milne (2008) analyse the interaction of banking sector book capital and optimal 
monetary policy, finding that the resulting impact on output-inflation tradeoffs is small and only 
arises at all if bank loan rates have a ‘cost channel’ impact on marginal costs of production.  
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funding for long term interest rate yielding assets, this increases bank net interest 
income and hence eventually the book value of bank capital. At the same time the 
cost of many bank liabilities are not sensitive to market rates of interest at all, so 
lower market rates of interest can reduce bank net interest income and lower 
capital. There is a similar ambiguity for the market value of bank capital. There 
little direct impact from short term rates of interest, but market values of bank 
capital depend critically on expectations of future bank earnings, of nominal and 
real income growth, and of long term interest rates, and these may or may not 
respond to shifts of monetary policy. 
  In the extreme, of which Japan in the early 1990s is be a good illustration, 
monetary policy is unable to shift expectations of continued weakness of nominal 
and real income growth. In such a case, even when monetary policy reduces short 
term market interest rates to or close to zero, the demand for bank lending remains 
low and capital constraints, partly through the low market value of bank assets, 
continue to limit the supply of funds to banks, and thus the expectations of low 
growth of incomes and of prices are confirmed. 
  Although the macroeconomic data for Japan described in Section 5 provide no 
clear evidence on monetary transmission, their experience of monetary deflation 
in the early 1990s supports our view that the bank balance sheets can attenuate 
rather than amplify the impact of monetary policy. If the bank lending channel or 
bank financial accelerator had been playing a quantitatively important amplifying 
role, then the Bank of Japan would have found it much easier than they in fact did 
to use monetary policy to stimulate deposit growth. 
  Japan was able to begin its escape from monetary deflation only when, later in 
the 1990s, Japanese banks finally properly recognised the scale of loan losses 
occurred in the ‘bubble economy’ of the late 1980s and were properly 
recapitalised by the Japanese government. We conclude that constraints on bank 
balance sheets not only limit the impact of monetary policy, but do so to a greater 
extent when the banking sector is as a whole is severely undercapitalised. 
Expansionary monetary policy is then not enough on its own to solve a systemic 
under-capitalisation of the banking sector. 
  Such systemic undercapitalisation has once again recently emerged for banks 
in the US and Europe, with the high level of losses on sub-prime mortgage 
securities and other structured credit products, and the resulting ‘credit crunch’ in 
which banks worldwide have been no longer able use mortgage backed securities 
to raise low cost wholesale funding. It appears – consistent with our analysis – 
that these funding problems have made it very difficult for banks to respond fully 
to relaxation of monetary policy. The situation therefore requires not just 
expansionary monetary policy response, but also the recognition of bank losses 
and a restoration of net worth through the issue of new capital, exactly the actions 
that have been adopted by financial authorities world wide in October of 2008 in 
response to the worsening global banking crisis.  
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Empirical studies of bank lending and monetary policy 
Many studies examine the bank lending channel and the more general issue of the 
role of bank credit in monetary transmission. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) review 
the role of credit in monetary policy transmission, making the helpful distinction 
between the balance sheet channel (also sometimes referred to as the financial 
accelerator) and the bank lending channel. The balance sheet channel arises when 
changes in the net worth of bank- dependent borrowers leads to an increase in 
their cost of raising external finance. Most often this is interpreted as an increase 
in bank monitoring costs, a mechanism which appears in several theoretical 
models including Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). 
  The bank lending channel focuses not on borrowers, but on the effect of credit 
market imperfections on the intermediation function of banks. Kashyap and Stein 
(1994, 1995) state the following conditions for the presence of a bank lending 
channel: (a) that some borrowers are bank dependent and cannot easily substitute 
other forms of finance for bank lending; and (b) bank loan supply is affected by 
bank balance sheet characteristics. Such supply impacts might arise through the 
conventional bank lending channel mechanism but they might equally occur 
because of constraints on net worth (equity capital) . Topi (2003) usefully 
contrasts the conventional bank lending channel, as modeled by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) and Stein (1998), with the impact of capital constraints on the 
supply of bank loans, arguing that the impact of capital constraints is likely to be 
much more important. Other theoretical models of bank intermediation emphasise 
the role of bank capital on loan supply, but do not model the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. 
  There is a large body of evidence consistent with the presence of a balance 
sheet channel. An influential study is Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) who find that 
bank lending to small manufacturing firms varies much more than does bank 
lending to larger firms, with changes in the net worth of firms. A large number of 
other studies (reviewed by Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) which report cash flow 
impacts on inventory and fixed capital investment also support the presence of a 
balance sheet channel. The balance sheet mechanism is now routinely introduced 
into dynamic general equilibrium models of monetary policy (beginning with 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). 
  There is also a large empirical literature – using similar specifications to the 
studies of corporate balance sheet effects – suggesting that capital, capital 
regulation, and bank profits all affect the supply of bank lending. These include 
Peek and Rosengreen (1993) who examine the role of capital regulations in the 
New England ‘capital crunch’ of the early 1990s, and Peek and Rosengreen  
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(1997, 2000) who find convincing evidence that the deterioriation of balance 
sheets of Japanese banks in the early 1990s had a significant impact on the loan 
supply of their US subsidiaries. Similarly Houston and James (1998) and 
Houston, Marcus and James (1997) find that holding company cash flows, in 
addition to cash flows of individual subsidiaries, provide a strong additional 
explanation of bank lending growth, a strong indication of a bank loan supply 
effect. Milne, Donaldson and Tang (2007) find similar evidence using 
international panels of bank accounting data, based on departures of individual 
bank capital ratios from their median observed values. 
  Other l studies are focused on the supposed amplifying impact of the bank 
lending channel on monetary policy. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), section IV, 
estimate a monthly vector autoregressive model of the relationship between the 
Federal funds rate, the unemployment rate, the log(CPI) and bank balance sheet 
variables ie a specification similar to that we explore in our Section 4. The 
relationships of the model are identified by the assumption that the Federal funds 
rate (used to measure the stance of monetary policy) is unaffected by other current 
variables. They then examine the relationship between monetary policy 
innovations – ie shocks to the Federal Funds rate – and the subsequent evolution 
of aggregate bank loans and deposits (reported in their Figure 4). They find that 
deposits fall in response to a tightening of monetary policy but this reduction is 
completed after some 8 months. They find that loans also fall, initially slowly, but 
eventually, after 24 months, by about twice as much as deposits. To quote (page 
903) ‘Loans seem to respond slowly to monetary policy innovations – which 
makes economic sense because loans are contractual commitments, and which 
also explains why loans are not particularly useful in forecasting. However, loans 
do eventually respond substantially to a change in the funds rate, with a timing 
that coincides closely to the response of the unemployment rate.’ They argue that 
this is evidence that loan supply is important in the transmission of monetary 
policy, even though monetary stocks are better predictors of aggregate demand 
than lending stocks. However, as they admit, this loan response could be due to 
shifts in loan demand rather than loan supply, so their findings must be regarded 
as inconclusive at least with regard to the presence of a bank lending channel. 
  Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein (1993) find that declines in corporate bank 
lending following monetary policy contractions are accompanied by an increase in 
the volume of commercial paper issuance, ie reduced bank lending is partly offset 
by a greater use of other external funding by borrowers who are not dependent on 
banks for financing. Hence, they maintain, the decline in bank lending is likely to 
reflect, at least in part, a shift in loan supply. This conclusion is however 
contested by Ohliner and Rudebusch (1996), who argue that the offsetting may 
instead be a consequence of a decline in the demand for external finance from 
smaller firms, which are unable to access the commercial paper market, combined 
with an increase in the demand for external finance from larger firms.  
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  Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) seek to resolve this identification problem by 
using individual bank data. Kashyap and Stein (1995) find that lending by small 
banks responds more to changes in monetary policy than does lending by large 
banks. They argue that this may be due to small banks finding it more difficult 
than large banks to access forms of finance alternative to reservable deposits, but 
acknowledge that their result may be due to differences in loan demand between 
small and large banks. Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that ‘amongst smaller banks 
in our sample, the impact of monetary policy is significantly higher for those with 
lower ratios of cash and securities’. They argue that this is a loan supply impact, 
since they are controlling for bank size and this finding is consistent with the 
prediction of the conventional model of the bank lending channel, that 
constrained, ie illiquid banks, will respond more than unconstrained banks to 
changes in monetary policy. 
  Other studies (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Altunbas, Fazylow and Molyneux, 
2002; Kishan and Opiela, 2005) argue – by appeal to the conventional model of 
the bank lending channel – that banks with relatively low capital ratios will be 
constrained in their ability to borrow on wholesale markets and therefore should 
respond to changes of monetary policy by more than unconstrained banks with 
relatively high capital ratios. They report evidence that banks with low capital 
ratios do indeed respond more to monetary policy than banks with high capital 
ratios, both in the US (Kishan and Opiela, 2000) and in Europe (Altunbas, 
Fazylow and Molyneux, 2002). Kishan and Opiela (2005) claim that bank lending 
channel should be asymmetric, that constrained banks should respond by more 
than unconstrained banks to a tightening of monetary policy than they do to a 
loosening of monetary policy, and report econometric results supporting this 
hypothesis. 
  Further specifications similar to that adopted by Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
have been estimated using European data sets (many of these studies were 
conducted as part of an ECB research network and published in published in 
Angelini, Kashyap and Mojon eds., 2003). These investigations have not 
produced clear results. Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (2001) do not find evidence 
of a bank lending channel, whereas King (2000) reports evidence of a bank-
lending channel in France and Italy, Ehrmann, et al (2003) also reports rather 
mixed results, finding that smaller banks respond more to monetary policy than 
large banks, but in some specifications more liquid banks turn out also to be more 
responsive (the opposite of what is suggested by the conventional model of the 
bank lending channel). They also report the outcome of estimating the same 
specification estimated using quarterly supervisory report data for the largest Euro 
zone countries, France, Italy, Germany, and Spain (these regressions are run 
separately for each country, confidentiality restrictions prevent these data being 
shared outside of individual national member banks of the system of European 
central banks and thus prevent them combining the datasets into one), finding that  
46 
less liquid banks respond more to monetary policy than more liquid banks. In 
none of their estimates are less capitalised banks more responsive to monetary 
policy than more capitalised banks. 
  To summarise, there is persuasive evidence that the balance sheet channel 
results in some borrowers, notably smaller firms, responding more than others to 
changes in monetary policy and there is a substantial body of evidence for related 
impact of bank profits on the supply of bank lending; but evidence of a bank 
lending channel through which monetary policy transmission has a relatively large 





Banking market equilibrium 
There are N banks of equal size indexed by n = 1…N. The only assets of these 
banks are loans and non-interest bearing reserves. The only liabilities are deposits 
and wholesale borrowing. The balance sheet constraint is thus L + R = D + W. 
Non interest bearing reserves are determined by reserve requirements R = βD so 
the balance sheet constraint can be rewritten as L = (1−β)D + W 
  Bank interest rates and resulting loan and deposit volumes are described by an 
amended version of the standard Klein-Monti model.
14 We make two amendments 
to this model: (a) we introduce additional parameters to capture the substitution 
between bank loans or deposits and the corresponding forms of market 
intermediation (for example commercial paper as a substitute for bank lending 
and money market mutual funds holding this commercial paper as a substitute for 
bank deposits); (b) we relax the assumption that the loan or deposits of two 
different banks are perfect substitutes for each other, allowing us to investigate the 
situation where the loan and deposit rates of the constrained banks can differ from 
those of the unconstrained banks. 
  The loan and deposit interest rates of bank n are 
n
L r  and 
n
D r . Aggregate loan, 



























Loans, deposits and wholesale funding of bank n are given by 
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Where the ν parameters represent elasticities with respect to the level of interest 
rates, the ε interest elasticities of substitution between bank assets or liabilities 
                                                 
14 Klein (1971), Monti (1972). For a textbook presentation see Freixas and Rochet (1997) Chapter 
3.  
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and market intermediated finance, and finally η are the interest elasticities of 
substitution between assets and liabilities of different banks. 
  For consistency with the Klein-Monti specification we assume that 
competition is in loan and deposit volumes ie banks choose interest rates and 
business volumes assuming all other banks maintain their loan and deposit 
volumes constant and adjust their interest rates accordingly. 
  The analysis utilises the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1. The elasticity of the assets and liabilities L
n, D
n, and W
n by bank n 
with respect to its interest rates 
n
L r,  
n
D r  and 
n
W r , taking account of the change in 
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Proof. Consider the response required of bank m, following a change in the 
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which establishes the lemma for the case of lending L. The same proof applies 
also to deposits and wholesale borrowing QED. □ 
 
 
All banks constrained to the same degree 
 
We consider first the case discussed in detail in the main text, corresponding to 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), when all banks are constrained to the same degree 
with εW < ∞. We assume that the volume of lending is adjusted to maintain the 
balance sheet constraint (1). There are then two first order conditions, one with 
respect to the volume of deposits D and the other with respect to the volume of 
wholesale funding, for the maximization of the profits of bank n as given by 
equation (4.3) 
 























































In this case where all banks are constrained to the same amount we may assume 
that ηL = ηD = ηW = 0, thus yielding equation (4.4) of the main text.We can then 
solve for the bank interest rates, for lending, deposits, and wholesale borrowing, 
using the balance sheet constraint (1). 
  Using these first order conditions, the comparative statics of a change in 
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If the elasticities εW, εD and εL are all positive and finite, we obtain equation (4.6) 
of the main text with strict inequality on the right hand side. 
  As a final step, for this case where all banks are constrained to the same 
degree, we have analyse the determinants of the shadow price of internal funds, 
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and substituting for  r rw −  using the exponential supply function for wholesale 
funding we obtain 
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showing that the shadow price increases with the amount of wholesale borrowing. 
 
 
Constrained and unconstrained banks 
 
We now extend the analysis of the main text discussing a second case 
corresponding to Stein (1998) where the N banks are divided into N
u 
unconstrained banks (indexed by n = 1…N
u) who can access wholesale capital 
markets and N
c = N − N
u constrained banks (n = N
u + 1…N) who cannot. We now 







= = λ . Constrained banks are all subject to the identical constraint 
that their ratio of deposits to loans exceeds some minimum level 
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The marginal source of funding for these banks is wholesale finance. The first 
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The constrained banks have no access to external finance. Their first order 
































L r r θ + θ = −  
 
Indicating that loan and deposit rates of the constrained banks both respond to the 
same extent to changes in market interest rates or to loan or deposit demand.  
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  To solve for these interest rates write the volume of lending and deposits of 
constrained banks as 
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From this we obtain the response of constrained bank interest rates to a change in 
market rates of interest 
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This expression shows that, provided there is less than perfect substitutability 
between the loans and deposits of different banks and between bank and market 
intermediation, the interest rates of constrained banks respond less than one for 
one to changes in market rates of interest. 
  The aggregate response of bank loan and deposit volumes is a bit more 
complicated, because we must allow for the competitive interaction between 
constrained and unconstrained banks. We can show that (proof omitted) that the 
response of aggregate bank lending to any given change in short term interest  
53 
rates is still reduced provided some banks are subject to constraints on their access 
to wholesale finance.  
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Appendix 3 
International data collection 
We collect two measures of bank deposits, a narrow measure eg sight deposit 
accounts and a broader measure including also savings/time deposits. Our 
preferred measure of bank credit, where available, is bank credit to the non-bank 
private sector. Real and nominal GDP are taken from the OECD main economic 
indicators database. Money market rates of interest are taken from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (Although IFS also provides real and nominal 
GDP series, these, although generally consistent with OECD MEI, have a small 
number of breaks – for real GDP in Canada, and Japan and nominal GDP in 
France and Italy.) MEI also correct for breaks such as German unification, so MEI 
is the better source of data to use for time series econometrics. 
  IFS also reports bank deposit and lending data, but there are many breaks in 
these series. We therefore as far as possible use national sources, which are more 
consistent over time, for our bank deposit and loan data, using IFS only where 
there is no other data source. For two of our Eurozone countries (Italy, and 
France) we use harmonized ECB banking statistics for the period 1997Q1–
2007Q2. While our GDP data are seasonally adjusted, there is evident seasonality 
in some of the banking data, for whole or part of the period. We correct for this 
seasonality and for reporting breaks as described below. 
 
 
These national sources are as follows 
 
GERMANY: (German banking data from the Bundesbank webpages goe back to 
the early 1950s, so we make no use of the IMF International Financial Statistics 











Deposits and borrowing from non-banks (non-MFIs) / 












The German data are reported in Deutsche Mark until December 1998 and in Euro 
thereafter. We convert all pre-1998 data to Euro at the fixed exchange rate of 1 
euro = 1.95583 DM 
  We must also allow for the break the German banking series in 1990.06 as a 
consequence of the re-unification with the former East Germany. Here we splice 
the series, assuming that the growth of all banking variables between 90.05 and 
90.06 is the average growth rate of 89.12–90.05 and 90.06–91.01. 
 
Definitions used by the Bundesbank: 
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/presse/publikationen/ 
geldpolitik_bundesbank_199610_en.pdf 
Demand deposits: held with credit institutions (giro money, sight deposits) which 
can be used as money by issuing cheques, direct debits or credit transfers. 
Sight deposits are part of the generally accepted ￿means of payment (￿money).  
 
NB: It seems that the definitions changed with the implementation of the euro. In 
particular, there was a change in the definition of an MFI. Building associations 
and money market funds now have to supply data and banks that only receive 
deposits from MFIs no longer have to. This should, however, make very little 
difference to our results, as according to Stefan Bruncken of Deutsche Bank: 
 
‘The breaks in the time series that were caused by this change were not 
significant, given the low businessWHAT MEAN? of these institutions. With 
respect to the joiners, money market funds (around 40 institutions) had to be 
included in the reporting population for monetary statistics for the first time. 
Nevertheless, reporting did not start from scratch as the collective investment 
undertakings had been already used to reporting supervisory data for their money 
market funds. The inclusion of money market funds caused minor breaks at the 
highest aggregation level including all types of MFIs, ie the aggregated and 
consolidated balance sheet of MFIs. Time series relating to credit institutions only 
remained unaffected. A special case were building and loan associations: they met  
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the MFI definition and had also reported balance sheet data to the Bundesbank in 




There is clear seasonality in all the German banking series from 1970Q1 until 
2001Q4. Thereafter the seasonality seems to disappear. We therefore include 
quarterly dummies in German banking regressions up to 2001Q4 and adjust for 
this seasonality in the descriptive charts. 
 
US: Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States. Historical 
monthly data back to 1973 are taken from: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/data.htm 
 
The specific series we use are (i) Total loans and leases in bank credit 
(b1020a.txt) (ii) Total loans and leases in bank credit less security related lending 
(b1030a.txt) and less other loans and leases (b1103a.txt) (iii) total deposits 
(b1058a.txt) (iv) transaction deposits (b1059a.txt) 
  We correct for the following breaks in the transaction deposit series. Between 
09/81 and 10/81 there is a one month fall in recorded transaction deposits from 
396.8 to 341.4 bn dollars. Between 12/83 and 01/84 there is a one month jump in 
recorded transaction deposits from 358.1 to 455.9 bn dollars. There is also a ten 
per cent jump in transaction deposits in Sept 2001 which falls off again in Oct 
2001 (possible a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks) and a somewhat 
smaller 5% one month fall in transaction deposits in Sept 2002 which recovers the 
following month. In these two cases, our Q3 money stock is the average of Aug 
and Oct, not the Sept figure. 
  We splice the time series for lending, time deposits, and total deposits from 
the IMF International Financial Statistics, for 1957–1972. There are no reported 
breaks in these series. 





We have used IMF IFS data, spliced as necessary for breaks, prior to 1997 and 




The ECB data and the IMF IFS data both exhibit evident seasonality in all the 
French and Italian banking series, but the season fluctuations are much more  
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pronounced in the IMF IFS data. We therefore apply separate season adjustments 





Monthly data back to 1993M10 can be found at: 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/theme/research/stat/asli_fi/index.htm 
 
We use total deposits, sight deposits (sum of current deposits and ordinary 
deposits), credit to non-bank sector (total loans and bills discounted) and credit to 
non-financial sector (credit to non-bank sector less lending on bills and less loans 
to financial sector). 
  The IMF IFS is used prior to 1994 with adjustment of breaks as necessary 
UK: 
 
The UK is problematic because its financial institution data are extremely 
fragmented. The IMF International Financial Statistics provides a series for total 
credit to the non-bank private sector (with breaks in 72Q4, 81Q4 and an obvious 
data error in 75Q2) back to 1963Q1. The Bank of England publishes a monthly 
series for net sterling lending to the non-bank financial sector by monetary 
institutions back to June 1982. We combine these two series, break adjusting the 
IFS data. 
  IFS also provide a total demand, time, and savings deposit series back to 
1963Q1 (with a fairly substantial break in 81Q4 and a much smaller break in 
75Q2). We can get Bank of England data on total retail deposits (combining the 
data series for banks and for building societies) from June 1982. The resulting 
measures are fairly close in 1982, so we splice these together to construct a total 
deposit series from 1963 onwards. 
  A sight deposit series is more difficult. There is nothing in the IFS database. 
We found annual bank of England data for total sight deposits of banks from 1973 
until 1986, then monthly data combining resident banks and building societies 
from Sept 1986. With some interpolation, with reference to older published 
statistics, there was some prospect of obtaining a quarterly series back to 1973 or 
possibly earlier, but we did not use this data for our analysis. 
  There is evident seasonality in the UK total deposit and lending data from 
1973 until 1980 (for bank lending) and until 1982 (for deposits). We seasonally 







We obtain lending data from September 1976 onwards, via 
http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/index.html, Table D02 of the statistical 
bulletin. We use total lending by banks and non-banks (the share of non-banks 
declines substantially over time). 
  Data for total deposits of banks and of building societies is obtained from the 
same source (Tables B03 and B07), providing monthly deposit data back to 
January 1989. There is no information on sight deposits from these sources. 
  For earlier data and for sight deposits we use IMF IFS.  
  There is evident seasonality in the Australian total deposit and sight deposit 






We use the IFS statistics for bank deposits and credit. In 2001Q4 there is a 
substantial break in all the banking series (they increase by more than 50%). We 






All data manipulations are carried out in Excel. 
 
Quarterly data reported by international organisations (the IMF International 
Financial Statistics are downloaded into the Excel 2003 workbook maindata.xls 
(spread sheets GDPV for nominal GDP, GDPQ for real GDP, mmrate for the 
monetary policy rate (quarterly average). 
  We also have a spread sheet of treasury bill rates which are used for some 
earlier periods when money market rates are unavailable. 
  There are separate worksheets containing the banking data for each individual 
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